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Harper v.

Great

Salt

Lake Council,

Inc.,

976 P.2d 1213,

1217 (Utah 1999), which will be reviewed for correctness.

Birch,

supra.
3.

Did the court below err in concluding that the Note

is an integrated agreement as a matter of law, despite the
fact that it was only one of at least 8 writings?
(Preserved below at R. 103-110)
Standard of Review: The determination as to
whether or not a writing is integrated is a question of
fact, not law.

Bullfrog

266, 270 (Utah 1972).

Marina,

Inc.

v.

Lentz,

501 P.2d

The court's conclusion that there

were no genuine issues of material fact should be reviewed
for correctness as set forth in issue no.
4.

9 below.
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is unambiguous as a matter of law?
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The court's
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fact should be reviewed for correctness as set forth in
issue no.
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9 below.

Did the court below err in awarding attorney's fees

and costs to Cantamar for enforcing the Note, despite the
fact that Cantamar is in violation of an oral agreement not
to enforce the Note?

(Preserved below at R.

270-272)

Standard of appellate review: Whether or not
to grant attorney's fees under a contract is a question of

law, Ml Vida. Enterprises
(Utah App.

Birch,

v.

Steen-Adams,

122 P. 3d 144, 147

2005), which will be reviewed for correctness.

supra.
9.

Did the court below err in concluding that there

were no genuine issues of material fact and that summary
judgment was appropriate as a matter of law?
below at R.

(Preserved

60-67; 103-114).
Standard of appellate review: On review of
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summary judgment, the appellate court reviews the trial
court's determinations of no genuine issue of material fact
Woodbury

for correctness, without granting any deference.
Amsource,
2003).

Inc.

v.

Salt

Lake County,

73 P.3d 362, 364 (Utah

In doing so, the appellate court employs the same

standard as the trial court; that is, it views facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment.

Durham v.
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App.

1989).

v.

Margetts,
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If the appellate court's review indicates that

a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment
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appellate court will review the trial court's conclusions of
law for correctness.
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There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the
appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a breach of contract case.

The complaint was

filed by Plaintiff, The Cantamar, LLC ("Cantamar") against
the Defendants, Data Systems International, Inc., Carlton J.
Champagne, and Lon E.

Williams (hereinafter collectively

"DSI") on or about January 9, 2003.

A summary judgment

motion was filed by Cantamar on or about June 16, 2003.
That motion was denied, without prejudice, on May 6, 2004.
Following additional discovery, a renewed motion for summary
judgment was filed by Cantamar on or about May 3, 2005.

The

renewed motion was granted at a hearing held on July 7,
2005, and summary judgment entered on September 6, 2005.
Notice of Appeal was filed on September 7, 2005.
Lon E.

Defendant

Williams filed a voluntary petition for relief under

Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on October
14, 2005, commencing Bankruptcy No.

05-39013 in the United

States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah.
Following is a statement of facts relevant to the
appeal:
1.

In the spring of 2000, Carl Champagne, the

president of DSI, was introduced to a loan and investment

-6-

broker named Troy Thuett,

(Affidavit of Carl Champagne

("Champagne Aff."), III, 5; R. 61).
2.

Thuett assured DSI that he could obtain a

$15,000,000 investment for DSI (the "Investment").

(Id.,

16; R. 61).
3.
DSI.

Starting in 2000, Thuett began lending money to

In making the loans, Thuett represented three

different entities:

Covenant Funding Group, Commercial

Lending Group, Inc., and Cantamar.
4.

(Id.,

110; R.

61-62).

The first loan was made in the summer of 2000, in

the amount of $10,000, to pay a broker fee.

There was a

written promissory note for $10,000, but DSI has not been
able to locate a copy of that note.

Prior to borrowing this

money, DSI expressly agreed with Mr. Thuett that repayment
would only be made from proceeds of an Investment obtained
by him.
5.

(Id.,

Ill; R. 62).

When the Investment did not occur by the spring of

2001, a second loan was made.
the amount of $220,000.

It was a line of credit in

The prior $10,000 loan was rolled

into the line of credit, and cash advances were made in
March 2001, in the amounts of $44,700 and $66,850.

-7-

These

cash advances were used for operations, loan broker fees,
(Id.,

and interest payments on the loans.
6.
72%.

The interest rate stated in the $220,000 note was

(R.
7.

512; R. 62).

70) .

Although evidenced by a promissory note, the line

of credit for $220,000 was not intended to represent an
obligation in the amount of $220,000.

Rather, it expressed

a willingness to lend DSI up to that amount.

As with the

other loans, it was subject to the verbal agreement that no
repayment would be due unless and until an Investment were
obtained by Thuett.
8.

(Id.,

513; R.

62).

During the summer of 2001, Thuett was working on

obtaining a $1,500,000 Letter of Credit for DSI to
facilitate obtaining the Investment.

The parties agreed

that upon obtaining the Letter of Credit, Thuett would be
paid $175,000, and would be given 200,000 option shares in
DSI.

The parties executed an Agent Agreement and Contract

at this time, reflecting their relationship and the goal of
obtaining the Letter of Credit and the Investment.
514; R. 63).
9.

DSI signed a promissory note reflecting the

-8-

(Id.,

potential obligation to pay a fee of $175,000.

The note was

conditioned on Thuett obtaining the Letter of Credit.

The

verbal agreement of the parties was that the note would only
be enforceable if and when a $1,500,000 Letter of Credit was
issued.

The Letter of Credit was never obtained.

No claim

has been made that the amount shown on the $175,000 note is
an obligation of DSI, and no effort to enforce that note has
been made.
10.
35%.

(Id.,

fl5; R.

63).

The interest rate stated in the $175,000 note was

(R. 76) .
11.

During the summer of 2001, Thuett made two

additional cash advances to DSI:

an advance of $70,000 on

June 1, 2001, and an advance of $40,896.00 on July 31, 2001.
To memorialize these advances, another promissory note was
created, in the amount of $115,000.00.

The money from these

two advances was used to make interest payments on the
loans, for broker fees and for DSI's operations.
R.

(Id.,

116;

63) .
12.

The interest rate stated in the $115,000 note was

60% until due, and 120% thereafter.
13.

(R. 80).

The next loan occurred in the fall of 2001, when

-9-

Thuett lent DSI $15,000 to make interest payments on the
prior loans.
14.

(Id.,

117; R. 64).

The interest rate stated in the $15,000 note was

60% until due, and 120% thereafter.
15.

(R. 84).

In January, 2002, another loan to pay interest on
(Id.,

prior loans was made, also in the amount of $15,000.
118; R.
16.

64).
The interest rate stated in the second $15,000

note was no interest until due, and 30% thereafter. (R. 88).
17.

The last loan was made in January, 2002, in the

amount of $269,285.07.
this loan was signed.
the Addendum).

A promissory note (the "Note") for
(A copy of the Note is included in

Along with the Note, DSI gave Mr. Thuett an

option to buy stock in DSI.
18.

519; R.

92-96).

The interest rate stated in the Note was 8% until

due, and 30% thereafter.
19.

(Id.,

(R. 92).

The Note did not include any cash advances to DSI.

It was nothing more than a consolidation of all prior loans.
Mr. Thuett prepared a ledger showing how he arrived at the
principal balance for the Note.

The ledger appears to

accurately reflect loans and interest payments.

-10-

(Id.,

520;

R.

98-99).
20.

From 2000 to 2002, Thuett and the representatives

of DSI often discussed DSIf s financial situation and the
need for the Investment.

Mr. Thuett would question DSI's

representatives about DSI's money needs and then offer to
make loans to DSI.

He offered the loans to DSI in order to

make the interest payments on prior loans and because he
kept assuring DSI that the Investment was imminent.
1122 and 23; R.
21.

(Id. ,

65).

Each time a loan was made, DSI's representatives

stressed to Mr. Thuett, and he agreed, that DSI would not be
able to re-pay the loan until the Investment was made to
DSI.

That understanding was a critical component of each of

the loans, since DSI knew and Mr. Thuett knew that DSI did
not have any other source for re-paying the loans.

(Id.,

124; R. 65).
22.

With regard to the interest rates stated in the

notes, DSI agreed to pay those rates only on condition that
an Investment were to be obtained from which the interest
could be paid.
2004, at 53; R.

(Deposition of Carl Champagne, July 13,
218) .

-11-

23.

DSI would not have accepted any of the loans, or

signed any of the promissory notes, without two explicit
assurances from Mr. Thuett in connection with each loan:
first, that the loan could not and would not be repaid until
the Investment was made; and second, that an Investment was
imminent.
24.

(Champagne Aff., 225; R.

65).

On January 11, 2002, DSI's representatives met

with Mr. Thuett in his office.

Those present at the meeting

were Carl Champagne, Lon Williams and Brian Bingel of DSI,
and Mr. Thuett.

He prepared the Note while they were there.

They received no legal or financial advice regarding the
Note.

During the meeting, DSI's representatives

specifically agreed with Mr. Thuett that the Note would not
be repaid, except from the proceeds of an Investment that
Mr. Thuett would obtain for DSI.
the Investment was imminent.
25.

He again assured DSI that

(Id., 126; R.

66).

There was no discussion or agreement, either

during the meeting on January 11, 2002, or at any other
time, to the effect that the Note was intended as a final or
complete expression of DSI's agreements with Mr. Thuett and
his companies.

To the contrary, it was understood by all

-12-

present at the meeting that the business affairs of DSI and
Thuett and his companies were incomplete, and that future
work, performance and agreements would be required on both
sides before completion of the business relationship.
Specifically, all agreed and understood that only the
successful closing of an Investment would allow the parties
to complete the deal.
26.

(Id.,

528; R.

66).

The gist of DSI's ongoing agreement with Mr.

Thuett was as follows:

if DSI would allow Thuett and his

companies to continue acting as DSI's broker, Thuett would
find an Investment for DSI, and in the meantime would
advance money to keep DSI viable; DSI would only re-pay the
advances (and the broker fee) from an Investment obtained
for DSI by Thuett.

(Id.,

229; R.

67).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The court below excluded parol evidence of an oral
agreement conditioning repayment of the Note on obtaining an
Investment.

The exclusion of evidence was erroneous.

The

parol evidence rule only applies to integrated agreements
and the Note is not an integrated agreement.

The parol

evidence rule only applies to unambiguous agreements and the

-13-

Note is ambiguous.

The parol evidence rule does not bar

evidence of fraud, mistake or condition precedent.

Even if

the evidence was properly excluded, which it was not, there
are genuine issues of material fact relating to whether the
interest charged in the Note is an unenforceable penalty.
Finally, Cantamar is not entitled to attorney's fees because
Cantamar itself is in breach of the oral agreement to obtain
an Investment prior to enforcing the Note.

For all the

foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be reversed and
the case remanded for trial.
ARGUMENT
;

I, :

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT BELOW
TO CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THE NOTE WAS AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT
The court below concluded as a matter of law that the
Note was an integrated agreement.

(See Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Plaintiffs Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter the "Findings and
Conclusions"), at 5, 15; R.

465-470; a copy of the Findings

and Conclusions is included in the Addendum) .
error.

This was

The determination as to whether or not a writing is

-14-

Bullfrog

integrated is a question of fact, not law.
Inc.

v.

Novel"

Lentz,
nc.

(Utah App.

v.

501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972);
The Canopy Group,

Inc.,

Marina,
accord,

92 P.3d 768, 772

2004) .

The fact question to be answered is "whether the
parties did in fact adopt a particular writing or writings
as the final and complete expression of their bargain."
Bullfrog

Marina,

supra,

501 P.2d at 270 (emphasis added).

To protect the integrity of written agreements, there
is a rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face
appears integrated is, in fact, integrated.
Swenson,

Union Bank s

707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).

In its Findings and Conclusions, the court below
identified those aspects of the Note tending" to show that,
on its face, it appears to be an integrated agreement.
(Findings and Conclusions, at 5, f4). Other aspects of the
Note, ignored by the court below, are inconsistent with
integration: for example, there is no integration clause in
the Note

There is

> mutual release.

There is no

statement indicating disposition of all claims.
The court below disregarded those aspects of the Note
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inconsistent with integration, and found integration as a
Id.

matter of law.

In doing so, the court also disregarded

the principle that any presumption of integration arising
from the face of the Note is rebuttable. Union Bank,

supra.

On appeal from summary judgment, a rebuttable
presumption is overcome if the court concludes, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment, that there is a genuine
issue of material fact.
Mlaml-Dade

County,

2002); Cansler
App.

2002).

v.

Genzmer

v.

Public

Health

Trust

of

219 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1279-1280 (S.D. Fla.
Mills,

765 N.E.2d 698, 705-707 (Ind.

Stated differently, summary judgment in favor

of a rebuttable presumption should be reversed if sufficient
evidence has been submitted so that a reasonable trier of
fact could find against the presumption.

Singh

Cross/Blue

Shield

308 F.3d 25, 32

(1st Cir.

2002) .

of Massachusetts,

Inc.,

v.

Blue

Although there are no Utah cases on the question of the
sufficiency of evidence needed to overcome a rebuttable
presumption on summary judgment, there is Utah law
consistent with the standard set forth above.
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Describing

the legal effect of a rebuttable presumption in an
employment case, the Utah Supreme Court said:
To rebut is to overcome, to contradict, to
persuade or convince to the contrary. ... Since
the employer must produce sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption of negligence, of course
the jury must weigh the evidence in the light and
against the force of the presumption, to determine
whether it has been outweighed or overcome.
Buhler

v.

Maddison,

176 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah 1947).

In the present case, there was ample evidence to rebut,
for purposes of summary judgment, any presumption of
integration adhering to the Note.
Statement of the Case, supra,
only one of seven notes.
C, D, E, F and G, R.

(See,

generally,

551 through 26). The Note was

(See

69-94).

Champagne Aff., Exhibits A,
At the time each of the seven

notes was signed, the parties agreed that no repayment Mould
be made unless and until an Investment were first obtained.
(R.

65) This agreement was a critical part of the ongoing

business relationship between Thuett and his companies
DSI, because all were aware that without an Investment there
would be no way to repay the loans,

(M

65)

Without the

agreement conditioning repayment, DSI would not have
accepted the loans or signed the notes.
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(R. 65).

In addition to the notes, the parties entered into a
written Agent Agreement and Contract.

This agreement

expressed in writing the ongoing condition precedent:
CLG has loaned DSI other bridge funds for
operating capital and interim capital needs. It
is the intent of DSI to pay all loans and interest
in full upon the funding of the WAFI loan.
Agent Agreement and Contract, attached to Champagne Aff.
Exhibit B, R. 74 (emphasis added).

as

The last promissory note in the series was the Note.
(R.

64). The Note did not include any actual money or new

value.

(R.

64).

notes.

(R.

64)

It was simply a rollover of the prior
The same agreement was made when the Note

was issued as had been made in connection with all the prior
notes: there would be no repayment unless and until an
Investment were to be obtained.

(R. 66).

At the time the Note was signed, it was understood by
the parties to it that their business affairs were
incomplete, that substantial future work and further
agreements would be necessary, and that only the successful
closing of an Investment would allow the parties to complete
their deal.

(R. 66).

The foregoing evidence is sufficient to rebut the
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presumption of integration because it raises a genuine issue
of fact as to whether the Note expressed the complete
agreement of the parties, or only a part of ll

"Where paxoJ

evidence shows that the writing in question expresses only
part of the agreement, courts refuse to find integration.
Bullfrog

Marina,

Magelsen

v.

supra,

Farnworth,

501 P.2d at 271-272;

accord,

2005 WL 914186 (Utah App,

2005)

("the written contract [is] one piece of the parties'
ongoing and evolving agreement rather than ... the *final
and complete' expression of their intent") (emphasis added)
(a c

£ the Magelsen

case is included in the Addendum) .

Cases finding integration tend to follow a fact pattern
different from that in the present case.

For example, in

Ron Case Roofing

v. Blomqulst,

and Asphalt

Paving,

Inc.

773

P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989), the progression of events followed a
pattern leading to an integrated agreement: a course of
business dealings, followed by disputes, followed by
negotiations, followed by a comprehensive settlement
agreement.

773 P.2d at 1383-1384.

As the Utah Supreme

Court observed:
The settlement agreement of January 24, 1983,
deals in a comprehensive fashion with the
-19-

relationship ... This indicates that the parties'
whole agreement is contained in the document.
Id. at 1385 (emphasis added) ; accord,
Terry's
Vander Veur, 618 P. 2d 29, 32 (Utah 1980)

Sales,

Inc.

v.

A similar fact pattern-dispute, negotiation, then
settlement—appears in Novell,
92 P.3d 768 (Utah App.

Inc.

v.

2004). In Novell,

The Canopy

Group,

the parties

negotiated in detail regarding the amount and method for
calculating royalties.

Id.

at 770.

Following those

negotiations, the parties entered into a written agreement
that spelled out their agreement on that precise point.

Id.

For that reason, that subject was closed to parol evidence:
Canopy's evidence clearly shows the parties
participated in prolonged negotiations to settle
their disagreements regarding the deductions and
Novell's overall percentage. ... [R]egardless of
whether the parties may have had preliminary
agreements about a given subject during the course
of negotiations, we will assume that a writing
dealing with the same subject
was intended by the
parties to supercede any prior or contemporaneous
agreements. [cites omitted]
Novell,
supra,
92 P.3d at 772 (underlined emphasis added;
italicized emphasis in the original).
It makes sense to bar parol evidence where extensive
negotiations over a defined subject matter produce specific
agreement on that point.

Allowing parol evidence of claimed
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inconsistent oral agreements in such a setting would
undermine the parties' efforts and cheapen the value of
written agreements.

The Novell

case provides a striking

example of this concern:
There is no dispute that earlier drafts of the
License Agreement included a deduction for
litigation expenses in the definition of the term
"Royalty Base7'. There is also no dispute that at
the six-hour "marathon" closing, after several
drafts of the agreement were proposed and
discarded, the litigation expense deduction was
removed.
Novell,

supra,

94 P.3d at 774 (emphasis added)

In other words, the "oral agreement'' Canopy was arguing
for in litigation had been proposed by Canopy (perhaps more
than once) in its extensive negotiations with Novell, but
had never been accepted by Novell; and at the final
negotiating session was dropped by Canopy.

It would be

wrong to allow Canopy to impose in litigation a contract
term that Novell had never agreed to in negotiations.
In contrast, cases refusing to find integration feature
a fact pattern inconsistent with the notion of a complete
and final agreement.

These cases tend to reflect more

elastic business relationships, ongoing or evolving deals,
or multiple written agreements, each covering only a part of
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See, e.g.,

the whole.
v.

Farnworth,

supra;

Bullfrog

Marina,

and Spears

v.

supra;

Warr,

MageIsen

44 P.3d 742, 746-

747 (Utah 2002).
The fact pattern in the present case fits with those
cases refusing to find integration.

The business

relationships were ongoing and evolving.

The loans to DSI

were only a part of the business relationship.

The Note was

only one of 8 written agreements, each covering only a part
of the deal.

The language of the Note is limited rather

than comprehensive.

The Note was not the product of careful

negotiation, but instead was a form agreement generated by
Mr.

Thuett while DSI's representatives sat in his office.

(R.

66)

The agreement that payment was to be made only if

and when an investment occurred was not just a proposal or a
negotiating point but instead was agreed on by both parties
as a necessary element of the ongoing business relationship.
(R. 65-67).
In these circumstances, summary judgment was erroneous
because it focused solely on the Note, disregarded
everything else, and imposed an agreement not contemplated
by the parties and unfair to DSI.
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II.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY
The court below concluded that the Note was
unambiguous.

(Findings and Conclusions, at 4, 53). Based

on that conclusion, and its finding that the Note was
integrated, the court below refused to consider DSI's parol
evidence and granted summary judgment.

Id.,

at 6.

Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of
law.

WebBank v.

American

General

P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002).

Annuity

Service

Corp. , 54

As will be shown below, the

trial court's legal conclusion that the Note is unambiguous
was erroneous, and there are genuine issues of fact in
dispute as to the intended meaning
A.

the Note.

The Doctrine of Practical Construction

Utah adheres to the doctrine of practical construction,
explained as follows:
Where the parties have demonstrated by their
actions and performance that to them the contract
meant something quite different, the meaning and
intent of the parties should be enforced. In such
a situation, the parties by their actions have
created the ambiguity to bring the rule into
operation. If this were not the case, the courts
would be enforcing one contract when both parties
-23-

have demonstrated that they meant and intended to
[sic] the contract to be quite different.
Bullfrog
Marina., supra,
501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added) /
accord,
Zeese v.
Estate
of Siegel,
534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah
1975), and cases cited therein.
The doctrine of practical construction is consistent
with Utah case law holding that parol evidence must be
considered in determining whether or not a writing is
ambiguous.

Ward v.

Intermountaln

P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); accord,

Farmers

Association,

Nielsen

v.

907

Gold's

Gym,

78 P.3d 600, 601 (Utah 2003).
In the present case, the actions and performance of the
parties established at least two areas of ambiguity: first,
the due dates on the notes were unimportant; and second,
although the notes were unconditional in form, in practice
they were conditional.
With regard to due dates on the notes:

None of the

prior notes' due dates was enforced or even discussed.

When

the parties met to sign new notes, the focus of the
discussions between them was not on repayment, but rather on
reassurances that an Investment was imminent.
66)

(R.

61, 65-

This was explained by Carl Champagne in his deposition:
Q.

It didn't trouble you that it says at a precise
-24-

due date?
No.
Q.

Why didn't that trouble you?

I
Because of all the other foolishness that we
were doing with all these other notes rolling them
over. There was a pattern of when it becomes due,
just roll them over, and I'm saying it doesn't
bother me, you get the investment, Troy, we'll pay
this.
Q. So you recognized that there was a due date on
the note; you just anticipated it would be rolled
over again?
A. Uh-huh. If he didn't get the investment, it's
going to be rolled, just understanding here we're
not paying any of this.
Deposition of Carl Champagne, at 67-68; R.
(emphasis added).

225-226

With regard to the conditional nature of the notes:

In

this series of documents there were two other promissory
notes that (like the Note) appeared to be unconditional
payment obligations but were not.

The first such note was

signed on or about March 1, 2001, in the amount of
$220,000.00.

(R.

70-72)

Although in the form of a

omissory note, the $220,000 note was really a line of
credit.

(R.

62) On the day it was signed, not more than

$144,261.50 had been advanced to DSI.
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(R. 62)

The second such note was signed on or about May 16,
2001, in the amount of $175,000.

Although the language of

the $175,000 note indicated a present obligation in that
amount, the actual intent of the parties was to promise a
potential commission.

The commission would be owing only if

and when a Letter of Credit were issued to DSI in the amount
of $1,500,000.
issued.

(R. 6 3 ) .

(R. 6 3 ) .

The Letter of Credit was never

No claim has been made that the $175,000

note is an enforceable obligation of DSI, and no effort has
been made to collect it.

(R.

63)

When the Note was prepared to reflect the balance owing
on all prior loans, neither the $220,000 note nor the
$175,000 note were included in the payoff calculation.
98-99).

(R.

The absence of these notes from the payoff

calculation is evidence that they were not intended as
enforceable obligations.
The $220,000 note, the $175,000 note and the Note were
all part of the ongoing business relationship between Mr.
Thuett and DSI.

Although nominally promissory notes, none

of the three was intended to function as a note.
they were potential

Rather,

obligations, subject to conditions that,
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though unstated in the body of each note, were understood
and agreed upon by the parties.
Evidence of the course of dealings between the parties
is admissible to show whether a written agreement is
integrated.

Ele

v.

St.

Benedict's

Hospital,

638 P.2d 1190,

1195 (Utah 1981).
In the present case, interpreting the Note without
reference to the course of dealing would work an injustice
on DSI.

Mr. Thuett made the loans to DSI, not as a lender

whose business is making loans and collecting them with
interest, but rather a*

broker interested in keeping a

client going in order to realize a much larger return.

That

return would consist first of a substantial commission (and
repayment of the loans) upon the closing of an Investment,
and second of an equity position in DSI.

Because he

believed an Investment was imminent, and because he wanted
the larger return, Mr. Thuett readily agreed that the loans
would be repayable only from the proceeds of the Investment.
B.

The Character of the Note is Ambiguous

In the court below, Cantamar asserted that the language
of the Note is clear and unambiguous regarding its maturity
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date.

(See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in Support of its Renewed Summary Judgment, at 2; R.

201).

Cantamar then argued that because the "four corners of the
agreement" appear to be complete and unambiguous, parol
evidence is not permitted.

(Id.,

at 3; R.

202)

Cantamar's argument ignores the requirement, set forth
by the Utah Supreme Court in the Ward case, that parol
evidence must be considered in deciding whether a writing is
ambiguous.

Ward,

supra,

907 P.2d at 268 ("[when determining

whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must
be considered").
Cantamar's argument also ignores the seminal case of
Colonial

Leasing

Company of New England,

Brothers

Construction

Colonial

Leasing,

Co.,

Inc.

v.

Larsen

731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

In

plaintiff financed defendant's acquisition

of heavy equipment through a written agreement labeled as a
"lease".

731 P.2d at 484.

The "lease" contained an

integration clause and expressly required return of the
equipment at the end of the lease.

Id.

at 485.

Despite the lack of ambiguity in the language of the
"lease" itself, the Utah Supreme Court held that a genuine
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issue of material fact as to the meaning and purpose of the
document prevented summary judgment.

Id.

at 487.

It was

the "character" of the agreement, not its specific wording,
that was ambiguous:
It is the general rule that if an agreement is
ambiguous because of lack of clarity in the meaning
of particular terms, it is subject to parol
evidence as to what the parties intended with
respect to those terms. [Cites omitted] We hold
that rule also applies where the character of the
written agreement itself is ambiguous even though
its specific terms are not ambiguous.
Colonial

Leasing,

supra,

731 P.2d at 487 (emphasis added).

In the present case, even though the maturity date in
the Note is not ambiguous, the Note as a whole is ambiguous
because its true character is not fully expressed in the
language of the Note.

In determining the true character of

a written agreement, evidence of the surrounding
circumstances and the intent of the parties should be
considered, as well as the language of the writing itself.
Id.

at 487-488.
The same rule should be followed in the present case,

which should be remanded for trial.

The court below should

be instructed to consider evidence of the parties' course of
dealing, the language and nature of other notes entered into
-29-

between the parties, and the verbal agreements placing
conditions on the payment obligation in the Note.

After

considering all the evidence, the court below will be able
to determine the true character and meaning of the Note.
III.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE ISSUE OF FRAUD
DSI pled fraud in the inducement as an affirmative
defense.

(See Answer, at 2, R.

20). Evidence in support
(See

of the defense was also presented.
M22-29; R. 65-67).

Champagne Aff.,

When Cantamar filed its motion for

summary judgment, DSI argued fraud as an affirmative defense
in its memorandum.

(See Memorandum in Opposition to Summary

Judgment, at 14-15, R.

113-114).

At oral argument on the

summary judgment motion, DSI's counsel raised fraud as a
defense.

(Tr.

of Hearing May 6, 2004, at 14-16).

When fraud in the inducement is alleged as a defense to
a written contract, parol evidence is admissible to prove
the defense.

Union Bank v.

Swenson,

707 P.2d 663, 666

(Utah 1985).
The court below initially received DSI's evidence of
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fraud, but later excluded it.
Conclusions, at 5, 54) .

(See Findings and

The basis for excluding the

evidence was the trial court's conclusion that the Note was
an integrated agreement.

Id.

Having excluded DSI's

evidence, the court below concluded that there was "no
genuine issue as to any material fact," and based on that
determination, enter summary judgment.

Id.,

at 6.

It was error for the court below to exclude DSI's
evidence, since "[parol evidence is admissible to prove that
a party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite a
determination that a writing is an integrated contract."
Union Bank,

supra,

707 P.2d at 666 (emphasis added) .

If DSI's evidence had not been erroneously excluded,
summary judgment could not have been granted, since issues
relating to fraud are issues of fact.
Cooperatives

v.

Meibos,

Berkeley

Bank

for

607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980).

There is an exception to the general rule just stated.
In rare circumstances, the issue of "reasonable reliance",
which is an essential element in a fraud claim, may be
decided on summary judgment as a matter of law.
Standard,

Inc.

v.

Getty

Oil

Company,
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Gold

915 P.2d 1060, 1067

(Utah 1996).
In Gold

Standard,

plaintiff's fraud claim was based on

a meeting which took place on March 2, 1982.

Id.

at 1067.

At that meeting, defendant promised plaintiff that its 25%
interest would be given back as soon as plaintiff got
Id.

financing.

Plaintiff claimed fraud when defendant
Id.

later reneged on that promise.

At trial, the jury

found in favor of plaintiff and awarded substantial damages,
including punitives.

Id.

at 1063.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff in Gold

Standard,

the

trial court granted judgment n.o.v., dismissing the fraud
claim.

Id.

affirmed.

at 1066.
Id.

On appeal, the judgment n.o.v. was

at 1069.

Affirmance was based on the

conclusion that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied
on the promise made at the March 2 meeting:
While the question of reasonable reliance is
usually a matter within the province of the jury,
[cite omitted] there are instances where courts may
conclude that as a matter of law, there was no
reasonable reliance.
Gold Standard,

supra,

915 P.2d at 1067.

The specific facts in Gold

Standard

brought it within

the exception, allowing the court to conclude as a matter of
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law that there was no reasonable reliance.
Standard,

In

Gold

the promise to restore p l a i n t i f f s 25% interest

was made on March 2.

The very next day, March 3, defendant

sent a letter, which plaintiff received, which directly,
explicitly, and specifically denied the promise.
1067.

Id.

at

A second letter was sent on March 12, also denying

the promise.

Id.

A third letter was hand delivered to

plaintiff on March 24, to the same effect.

Id.

In view of these letters, the Utah Supreme Court held
that plaintiff could not possibly have continued to rely on
the promise for more than one day, and nothing happened in
that one day to cause damage to plaintiff.

Id.

at 1068.

The facts in the present case are not at all similar to
those in Gold

Standard.

In contrast to the immediate and

repeated disavowal of the promise in Gold

Standard,

the

facts in the present case show the opposite pattern:
repeated reaffirmations of the promise, and never a
disavowal.

(Champagne Aff., 5222-29/ R.

65-67).

In the court below, Cantamar argued that the
Standard

Gold

rule should be applied in the present case,

asserting that the Note itself was a writing disavowing the
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oral agreement.

(See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion

for Summary Judgment, at 6-9, R. 131-134).
This argument is misplaced, however, because the Note
does not contain any direct, explicit, or specific denial of
the oral agreement.

(See Note in Addendum below) .

The

Note, instead, is silent with regard to the oral agreement,
and therein lies the difference between a factual issue of
reasonable reliance and a conclusion as a matter of law, a

la Gold

Standard.

The facts in the present case are much more closely
aligned to those in the Union
supra,

Bank

case.

In Union

Bank,

the Swensons borrowed money from Union Bank for their

company, State Lumber, Inc.

707 P.2d at 664.

The loan

documents contained signature lines for State Lumber and for
the Swensons "individually and personally."

Id.

They

signed the loan documents, the loan was made, the company
defaulted, and the bank sued the Swensons personally.

Id.

As a defense, Swensons claimed that the bank's officers
had promised them "that their signatures were for
appearances only and no collection action would be brought
against them personally."

Id.
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(Emphasis added).

The Bank sought to brush aside Swensons' defense,
arguing that since the loan documents were integrated,
evidence of the alleged verbal promises was barred by the
parol evidence rule.

Id.

The trial court agreed and

granted summary judgment, which the Supreme Court reversed.
Id.

at 664-665, 669.
The reasoning for the Court's reversal in Union Bank is

applicable in the present case.

The Court held that the

Swensons' allegations raised a genuine issue of fraud in the
inducement, precluding summary judgment.

"Parol evidence is

admissible to prove that a party was induced into a contract
by fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an
integrated contract."

Id.

(Emphasis added).

The Court

quoted the following rule with approval:
If a parol contemporaneous agreement be the
inducing cause of the written contract, or forms a
part of the consideration therefor, and it appears
the writing was executed on the faith of the parol
agreement or representation, extrinsic evidence is

admissible.
admission is

In such cases,
the real
to show fraud.

basis

for

its

Union Bank, supra,
707 P.2d at 667, quoting from Bell
v.
Lammon, 179 P.2d 757, 761 (N.M. 1947) (italicized emphasis
in the original; underlined emphasis added).

The same rule was followed by the Utah Supreme Court in
-35-

a second case factually similar to the present case.
W.W. and W.B. Gardner,

Inc.

v.

In

Mann, 680 P.2d 23 (Utah

1984), plaintiff was attempting to enforce a promissory
note.

680 P.2d at 24.

The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiff in spite of the
defendant's argument that when he signed the note, the
plaintiff agreed to obtain payment of the note from a
particular source.

Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued

that the parol evidence rule barred evidence of the payment
arrangement.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding

that fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule.

The

Court further held that evidence showing that a note was
taken subject to an agreement for it to be repaid from a
particular fund stated a claim for fraud sufficient to
defeat summary judgment.

Id.

at 24-25.

The difference between Gold
and Union
Standard

Bank

and Gardner

Standard

on the one hand

on the other is that in

Gold

the writings directly, explicitly and specifically

denied the verbal promise, whereas in Union

Bank

and

Gardner

the notes were silent regarding the verbal promise.
The rule applied in Union

Bank
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and Gardner

should also

be applied in the present case.

The evidence establishes,

for summary judgment purposes, that DSI signed the Note in
reliance on an oral agreement that they would only have to
repay the Note from the proceeds of an Investment.
itself was silent with regard to the agreement.

The Note

For that

reason, "reasonable reliance" is an issue of fact and
summary judgment was improper.
IV.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
FAILURE OF THE CONDITION PRECEDENT
MADE THE NOTE DUE AND PAYABLE
In the court below, there were two hearings on
Cantamar's summary judgment motion.
place on May 6, 2004.

The first hearing took

(Tr., at 1 ) . At the conclusion of

that hearing, Cantamar's motion for summary judgment was
denied, without prejudice, largely because of parol evidence
of a condition precedent.

Id.,

at 23:12 through 24:7.

The initial ruling of the court below, denying summary
judgment, was correct because there is substantial parol
evidence of a condition precedent. Even where a written
agreement is integrated, the parol evidence rule does not
bar evidence of a condition precedent.
-37-

In FMA

Financial

Corporation

v.

Hansen

Dairy,

Inc.,

617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980),

defendants were farmers who wanted a corn silo.

Id.

They offered to buy the silo from a man named Levie.

at 328.
Id.

Rather than financing the deal himself, Levie contacted FMA.
Id.

FMA arranged to buy the silo from Levie and lease it to

the defendants.

Id.

When the defendants met with Levie to sign FMA's lease,
they made the deal conditional on Levie installing the silo
"by corn harvest time.'7

Id.

at 329.

Levie failed to set

the silo up in time and defendants refused to pay for it.
Id.
FMA sued the defendants for breach of the lease.
at 328.

Id.

FMA argued that the lease was "integrated, clear,

definite, and unambiguous", and did not require installation
by "corn harvest time".

Id.

at 329.

Because the written

agreement contained no time limit for installation, FMA
argued that testimony of such a limit was barred by the
parol evidence rule.

Id.

The FMA court observed that the parol evidence rule
does not bar:
...proof that a party did not perform an obligation
which it was understood and agreed by the parties
-38-

was a condition precedent to the contract becoming
effective.
Id.

(emphasis added).
The same rule was applied in another Utah case:
[I]f a written instrument is delivered upon an
express condition, and is not to be effective until
the condition is fulfilled, the condition upon
which it was delivered, ... may be shown by parol.

Central
Bank of Bingham v.
Stephens,
(Utah 1921) (emphasis added).
The rule applied in FMA and Central
applied in the present case.

199 P.

1018, 1021

Bank should also be

The testimony establishes, for

summary judgment purposes, that the parties understood and
agreed that only if and when Thuett obtained an Investment
would the loans be repayable.

That condition, like the one

in FMA, was not written into the agreement.

Instead, it

functioned as a condition precedent to the payment
obligation in the Note.
In 2005, Cantamar renewed its motion for summary
judgment.

A hearing on the renewed motion took place on

July 7, 2005.

(Tr.

at 32). At the conclusion of the

second hearing, the motion for summary judgment was granted.
Id., at 67, lines 4-10.
In granting summary judgment at the second hearing, the
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court below did not find or conclude against the existence
of a condition precedent; instead, the court concluded that
the condition precedent had failed, and therefore the Note
was due and payable in full.

(Findings and Conclusions, at

5, 55).
The conclusion of the court below was erroneous.

The

law in Utah is clear that failure of a condition precedent
does not result in the obligation becoming immediately due.
On the contrary, it acts to relieve the obligor of any duty
to perform:
Under well-established principles of contract
interpretation, where the duty of the obligor to
perform is contingent upon the occurrence or
existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may
not require performance by the obligor, because the
obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right
to demand performance, does not arise until that
condition occurs or exists, [cite omitted] Failure
of a material condition precedent relieves the
obligor of any duty to perform.

Harper

v.

Great

Salt

Lake Council,

Inc.,

976 P.2d 1213,

1217 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added).
Most other courts follow the same rule.
Dengler

v.

(Idaho 2005)

Hazel

Blessinger

Family

Trust,

See,

e.g.,

106 P.3d 449, 454

("When there is a failure of a condition
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precedent through no fault of the parties, no liability or
duty to perform arises under the contract") ; Johnson
Coss,

v.

667 N.W.2d 701, 705 (S.D. 2003) ("It is a general

principle of contract law that failure of a condition
precedent ... bars enforcement of the contract");
Management,
(Mont.

Inc.

v.

Mastersons,

Inc.,

616 P.2d 356, 360

1980) ("If the condition is not fulfilled, the right

to enforce the contract does not come into existence");
Golden

Heights

Company,

Land Company,

Inc.

102 So.2d 858, 859 (Fla.

v.
App.

Norman Babel
1958)

Mortgage

("the

principle is well established that where a particular fund
from which payments are to be made does not materialize, the
Scafldl

court is not at liberty to grant a money judgment") ;
v.

Johnson,

420 So.2d 1113, 1116 (La.

1982) ("There was a

condition precedent to Johnson's obligation: that is,
receipt of dividends, or other distribution of corporate
funds sufficient to make payment.

Since there was

nonperformance of this condition, Johnson is not liable on
the note to Scafidi").
The present case should be remanded for trial.

At

trial, the court below can make findings based on all the
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evidence as to whether a condition precedent was in effect
and if so, whether it has failed.

If it has failed, and the

Note (with its onerous interest rate and due date) is not
enforceable under contract law, repayment of the loans may
still be appropriate under equitable principles, on terms
fair to both sides.

.: v.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
ISSUE WHETHER THE INTEREST ON THE
NOTE WAS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY
Utah7 s courts refuse to enforce liquidated damages
provisions that amount to penalties.
v.

Washington,

Woodhaven

Apartments

942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997).

Any liquidated damages provision that exceeds a
reasonable estimation of actual damages is an unenforceable
penalty:
Damages recoverable under a liquidated damages
provision in a contract will generally be limited
to an amount that represents a reasonable
estimation, at the time the contract was drafted,
of what would be necessary to compensate the
nonbreaching party for losses caused by the breach.
This policy is based on the view that any
liquidated damages provision not so limited results
in the imposition of a penalty on the breaching
party that is not permitted.
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Reld v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
1989) (emphasis added).

Co.,

776 P.2d 896 (Utah

Default interest rates in promissory notes are treated
the same as liquidated damages provisions:
Labeling a contract term an interest provision does
not make it so. If, though labeled interest, it
exacts a penalty or sets liquidated damages in an
impermissible manner, it will not be enforced.
In re Kalian,

178 B.R. 308, 313-314 (Bkr. D.R.I. 1995)

(emphasis added).
DSI has found only one Utah case deciding whether a
default interest provision was unenforceable as a penalty.
In Prudential

Capital

Group Co. v.

Mattson,

802 P.2d 104

(Utah App. 1990), Mattson leased an airplane.

The lease

called for interest at 24% on all unpaid lease payments.
Id.

at 105.

The Court of Appeals upheld the default

interest provision for the following reasons:
1.

The Court of Appeals was unable to compare actual

damages against liquidated damages because the trial court
made no findings and Mattson failed to marshal the evidence
presented below, Id.
2.

at 107;

Mattson had both legal and financial advice, was

advised by his attorney not to sign the lease, but did it
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anyway, Id.;
3.

and

The liquidated damages

($246,461.69) were not so

excessive, in view of the full term value of the lease
($1,279,588.80), as to shock the conscience of the reviewing
court sufficiently to reverse the lower court.

Id.

The present case is distinguishable from Prudential
all three points.

on

First, Cantamar presented no evidence of

damages other than loss of use of the money, and attorney's
fees, both of which are separately provided for in the Note.
DSI, however, did present evidence that there were no other
damages.

(Champagne Aff., 530; R.

67).

Second, DSI received no advice whatsoever regarding the
advisability of signing the Note.

(Id.,

526)

Finally, and most importantly, the default interest
amount is disproportional to the loans.

The loans

(including the initial $10,000 loan), totaled $232,446.
(Champagne Aff., f20, R.

64; Exhibit I, R.

98-99).

Interest payments totaling $69,528,45 were made between
March 1, 2001 and January 11, 2002, yet the principal amount
of the Note was nevertheless increased to $269,285.07.
This means that interest totaling $106,367.52

-44-

Id.

(consisting of

the $69,528.45 actually paid plus the increase of $36,839 in
loan principle from $232,446 to $269,285) was charged on the
loans, an effective annual interest rate of nearly 55% for
the period of time from March 1, 2001, through January 11,
2002.

Accrued interest was compounded with the principal

amount of the loans to arrive at the amount of the Note.
The court below awarded Cantamar the 55% compounded
interest rate built into the Note.

Additional interest in

the amount of $47,125 through December 11, 2002, was then
added.

Finally, the court required interest to be paid at

the rate of 30% on the unpaid principle of the Note from and
after December 11, 2002.

(Findings and Conclusions, p . 5 , 1 7 ) .

Interest on $269,285 from December 11, 2002, through
the date of entry of judgment
$221,773.

(September 6, 2005) is

The Note amount ($269,285) plus interest through

December 11, 2002 ($47,125) plus interest at the default
rate of 30% through the date of entry of judgment
equals $538,183.

($221,773)

To this sum must be added the $69,528 in

payments already made by DSI, making the total amount to be
repaid by DSI to Cantamar $607,711.

This exceeds the loan

advances by $375,265, for an average annual interest rate of
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about 35% from March 2002 through September 2005.
In the Mattson

case, one of the main reasons for

finding no penalty was that actual damages exceeded interest
charges by about 500%.

802 P.2d at 107.

In the present

case, the situation is the opposite: interest exceeds actual
damages by 161%.
Summary judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded for trial.

At trial, the court below should

determine whether the interest charged in the Note
represents a reasonable estimation of actual damages.

To

the extent the interest exceeds actual foreseeable damages,
it should be treated as an unenforceable penalty.
VI.
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED
TO ALLOW THE COURT BELOW TO
CONSIDER REFORMATION OF THE NOTE
Courts have power in equity to reform contracts to
correct mutual mistake, and in appropriate cases to correct
a unilateral mistake as well.
Stangl,

Guardian

State

Bank

v.

778 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Utah 1989).

In the Guardian

State

case, the mistake was not a

mutual mistake, but instead was a unilateral mistake.
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In

that case, the bank endorsed and delivered a promissory note
without a restrictive endorsement.

778 P.2d at 2.

Omitting

the restrictive endorsement resulted in the bank losing the
ability to collect on the note from a guarantor.
3.

Id.,

at 2-

The trial court ruled against the bank, holding that the

bank's unilateral mistake in failing to add the restrictive
endorsement did not provide a basis for relief.

Id.,

at 3.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, reformed the endorsement,
and added the restriction.

In doing so, the Court provided

guidance appropriate for the present case:
When one party's mistake of fact is coupled with
knowledge of the mistake by the other party or a
mistake is produced by fraud or other inequitable
conduct by the nonerring party, the mistake
provides a basis for reformation or rescission.
Stangl,

supra,

778 P.2d at 5 (emphasis added).

The mistake by DSI in the present case is the same as
the mistake by the bank in the Guardian
to include language in a note.

State

case: failing

This mistake resulted in an

unfair outcome inconsistent with the parties' understanding.
Thuett knew very well that the Note did not contain the
agreement making payment conditional on an Investment.
he did nothing to correct DSI's mistake.
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Yet,

Now Cantamar wants

to take advantage of the omission despite the knowledge and
active participation of its own agent (Thuett) in the
failure.

It would be inequitable to allow Cantamar to sweep

its agent's promises under the rug and enforce the Note and
its onerous interest rates.

This case should be remanded so

that the court below can consider all the evidence at trial
in order to determine whether, in equity, DSI's mistake
should be the basis for reforming the Note to conform to the
actual intent of the parties.
VII.
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
CANNOT BE USED TO PREVENT
EQUITABLE REFORMATION
The parol evidence rule does not apply in situations
where reformation is appropriate:
The right to reform is given, at least in part, so
as to make the written instrument express the
bargain the parties previously orally agreed upon.
When a writing is reformed the result is that an
oral agreement is by court decree made legally
effective although at variance with the writings
which the parties had agreed upon as a memorial of
their bargain. The principle itself modifies the
parol evidence rule.
Sine v.
Harper,
222 P.2d 571, 578 (Utah 1950) (emphasis
added); accord,
Kesler
v. Rogers,
542 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah
1975).
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VIII.
CANTAMAR IS NOT ENTITLED
TO ATTORNEYS FEES
The court below awarded attorney's fees in the amount
of $30,243.00, and costs of $1,373.87, to Cantamar.
(Findings and Conclusions at 5, 57).
The award of fees and costs to Cantamar was erroneous.
It disregarded a fundamental rule of contract law: when one
party to a valid contract commits an "uncured material
failure" in its performance of the contract, the non-failing
party is relieved of its duty to continue to perform under

the contract."

Aquagen International,

Inc.

v.

Calrae

Trust,

972 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1998).
In the present case, Cantamar has failed to perform an
essential element of the Note, that is, to obtain an
Investment for DSI.

This failure was central to the

performance of DSI pursuant to the terms of the Note, since
it was understood and agreed that DSI would not have the
capacity to pay pursuant to the terms of the Note without
the Investment.

(R. 65).

Since Cantamar has failed to secure an Investment, it
cannot enforce the terms of the Note, specifically its due
-49-

date, default interest rate, and amount.
CONCLUSION
DSI's parol evidence should not have been excluded.

It

was relevant and important in determining the meaning and
character of the Note.

Summary judgment must be reversed

and the case remanded for trial.
DATED this

/' ^

day of December, 2005.

Chris L. Schmutz
Schmutz & Mohlman
Attorneys for Appellants
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
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THE CANTAMAR LLC,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

CARLTON J. CHAMPAGNE, an
individual, LON E. WILLIAMS, an
individual, and DATA SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 030600077
Judge Darwin C. Hansen

Defendants.
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On July 7,2005, hearing was held on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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Having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties, having heard the
arguments of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants, and pursuant to the Court's ruling made July
7, 2003, the Court hereby enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant Data Systems International, Inc. (UDSF') made, executed and

delivered to Cantamar, for valuable consideration, a Promissory Note ("Note"), dated January
11, 2002, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to Cantamar's Complaint, in which
defendant DSI promised to pay to Cantamar the sum of 5269,285.07 plus interest thereon at the
rate of 8% per annum, prior to maturity, and at the rate of 30% per annum after maturity.
2.

The Note states that it is due and payable in full on May 11, 2002, as

follows:
The unpaid principal and accrued interest shall be payable in monthly
installments of $1,795.23, beginning on February 11, 2002 and
continuing until May 11, 2002 (the "Due Date") at which time the
remaining unpaid principal and interest shall be due in full.
3.

On or about January 17, 2002, defendants Carlton J. Champagne and

Lon E. Williams each made, executed and delivered to Cantamar their Guaranty (the
"Guaranties"), included on page 3 of the Note, wherein defendants Carlton J. Champagne and
Lon E. Williams guaranteed and promised to pay to Cantamar all indebtedness owed by DSI to
Cantamar.
4.

DSI failed to pay the Note at maturity.

?

5.

DSI has also failed to make monthly interest payments on the Note. DSI

has not paid any interest on the Note since May, 2002.
6.

The amount owing on the Note is the principal sum, of $269,285.07 with

accrued unpaid interest to and including December 11, 2002, of $47,124.89, all interest accruing
thereafter on the impaid principal at the default rate of interest of 30% per annum until all such
principal is paid in fall
7.

The Note was a refinance of prior obligations owed by DSI to Commercial

Lending Group. Specifically, the Note refinanced outstanding obligations owed by DSI to
Commercial Lending Group under a Promissory Note dated March 1, 2001 and a Promissory
Note dated July 30, 2001.
8.

Actual cash advanced to DSI pursuant to these prior notes that were

refinanced by the Note to Cantamar was $222,446.00. The remaining amounts included in the
Note were unpaid fees and interest under the prior notes owed to Commercial Lending Group.
9.

Defendants allege that they entered into an oral agreement with Troy

Thuett at the time the Note was signed that the Note would not be repaid until Troy Thuett
obtained for DSI a $15 million investment.
10.

Defendants acknowledge that the Note clearly states the terms of

repayment, but for the alleged oral agreement concerning the Due Date.
U.

The Note reflects monies borrowed by DSI? debt owed by DSI to

Cantamar and is reflected on the books and records of DSI as an obligation owing to Cantamar.
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12.

Defendants also acknowledge that the Note evidences an obligation to

make monthly interest payments.
13.

Defendants made four monthly payments of interest under the Note, for

the months of February, March, April and May, 2002 and made no other interest payments due
to alack of funds.
14.

Defendants' last contact with Troy Thuett in relation to pursuing the S15

million investment for DSI was in early 2002.
15.

Defendants do not have any current expectation that Thuett will obtain this

investment for DSI and defendants consider it a "dead deal."
16.

The interest rates stated in the Note were a substantial reduction of the

interest rates on the notes owed by DSI to Commercial Lending Group that were refinanced by
this Note, in that the prior notes bore interest at 72% per annum and 60% per annum (with the
latter note providing for 120% per annum interest after default).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

DSI is obligated as Maker of the Note.

2.

Defendants Carlton J. Champagne and Lon E. Williams are liable as

guarantors of the Note.
3.

The Note is unambiguous. The Note clearly and unambiguously states

that monthly interest payments are required of the maker. The Note clearly and unambiguously
states that the entire unpaid balance of the Note is due and payable in full on May 11, 2002, the
"Due Date."
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4.

The Note is an integrated agreement, as a matter of law. The language of

the Note suggests that the Note is integrated in that it contains the elements expected to be
contained in a Note, including stating the repayment terms. Nothing in the language of the Note
suggests that anything is missing from the Note. The unambiguous statement in the Note of the
amount and the due date further suggests that the Note is an integrated agreement. Defendants'
alleged oral agreement is insufficient to overcome the presumption of integration. Defendants'
alleged oral agreement is therefore barred by the parol evidence rule.
5.

Defendants' alleged condition precedent to the effectiveness of the Due

Date has failed, making the Note due and payable in full.
6.

Defendant DSI is in default under the terms of the Note for failure to make

interest payments and for failure to pay the balance of the Note on the Due Date of May 11,
2002.
7.

Defendants are jointly and severally indebted to plaintiff in the principal

amount of $269,285.07, plus interest thereon to and including December 11, 2002 in the amount
of $47,124.89, plus further interest thereafter on the unpaid principal at the contract rate of 30%
per annum, until paid; plus plaintiffs attorneys' fees incurred herein in the amount of
$30,243.00, plus plaintiffs' costs of suit of S S ^ 4 & ^ '
8.

/£2j&

The attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiff herein are provided for by the

Note and are reasonable and appropriate.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs renewed motion for summary judgment is granted, there being no

genuine issue as to any material fact, and plaintiff is granted summary judgment against
defendants on plaintiff s First and Second Causes of Action.
DATED this £ £ _ clay of.

2005

^^/f

'

BYTHE\COURT:

tonorable Darwin C. Hansen
district Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

\M&^M
"

Chris L. Schmutz

J*

^ ^ •
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Attorney for Defendants
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2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 188
(Cite as: 2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Benjamin R. MAGELSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Randy FARNWORTH and Earl Loftus, dba Randy's
Heating and Air Conditioning,
Inc., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20030320-CA.
April 21, 2005.
Fourth District, Provo Department; The Honorable Claudia
Laycock.
Blake T. Ostler. Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Stephen Ouesenberry and J. Brvan Ouesenberry. Provo, for
Appellees.
Before Judges BENCH. JACKSON, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
THORNE. Judge:
*1 Benjamin R. Magelsen sued Randy Farnworth and Earl
Loftus, dba Randy's Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc.
(collectively Randy's), for breach of contract arising out of
the installation of a heating and air conditioning (HVAC)
system in Magelsen's home. Following a bench trial, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of Randy's. Magelsen
appeals and we affirm.
Magelsen first challenges the trial court's determination that
a written contract between Magelsen and Randy's was not
an integrated agreement. " 'An agreement is integrated
where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the
final and complete expression of the agreement.' " Novell
Inc. v. Canopy Group. Inc., 2004 UT App 162.f 10. 92
P.3d 768 (quoting Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d
1190. 1194 (Utah 1981V). However, even though a writing
appears to be integrated on its face, a court may still
consider any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, to
make its initial integration determination. See id. at Tf 11.

© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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Here, the trial court was presented with two conflicting
versions of the same written contract. The court properly
determined that, at a minimum, parol evidence was
necessary to resolve the conflict between the two
documents. [FN1] However, the court was also presented
with several other oral and written agreements between the
parties pertaining to the HVAC installation. These other
agreements occurred both before and after the execution of
the written contract, and included an initial proposal and
two postcontract change orders. In light of the evidence, the
trial court appropriately viewed the written contract as one
piece of the parties' ongoing and evolving agreement rather
than as the "final and complete expression" of their intent.
M a t 1J10.
FN1. The court ultimately determined that the
written agreement provided by Magelsen was
fraudulently created.
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment
awarding damages and attorney fees to Randy's. The trial
court entered extensive factual findings in support of this
judgment, particularly addressing the intent of the parties as
regards their various agreements. Magelsen challenges
several of the trial court's factual findings on the intent of
the parties.
" 'If a contract is not integrated or is ambiguous and the trial
court finds facts regarding the parties' intent based on
extrinsic evidence, we will not disturb the findings unless
they are clearly erroneous.' " Fairbonrn Commercial Inc. v.
American Hous. Partners. Inc.. 2003 UT App 98.^ 13. 68
P.3d 1038 (quoting Schmidt v. Downs. 775 P.2d 427. 430
(Utah Ct.App.1989)). affd, 2004 UT 54. 94 P.3d 292. To
successfully challenge the trial court's factual findings,
Magelsen "must marshal all relevant evidence presented at
trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate
why the findings are clearly erroneous." Rappleye v.
Rappleve. 2004 UT App 290.^ 27. 99 P.3d 348 (quotations
and citation omitted), cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 fUtah
2004).
Magelsen has failed to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings, and accordingly his challenge to
those findings must fail. Further, the trial court made

to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

WestJaw
Not Reported in P.3d
2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App ^ (Cite as: 2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.))

specific findings that Magelsen and his witnesses lacked
credibility and that Magelsen submitted a fraudulent version
of the parties' written contract to the court as evidence.
Under these circumstances, we will presume that the trial
court's factual findings are correct.
*2 Magelsen also challenges the trial court's award of
damages and attorney fees to Randy's, and its failure to
award damages to him. The damages and attorney fees
awards are adequately supported and justified by the trial
court's factual findings, and Magelsen has presented no
legal authority to the contrary. Rather, Magelsen's
arguments regarding the awards implicitly attack the trial
court's factual findings. As such, these arguments also fail
for lack of marshaling. See id.
The trial court: properly determined that the written
agreement of the parties was not integrated and made
extensive factual findings that support its judgment of
damages and attorney fees in favor of Randy's. Accordingly,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH. Associate
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON. Judge.
2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 188
ENDOFDOCI JMENT
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BALLOON PA YMENT PROMISSORY NOTE
$269,285.07

Date: January 11, 2002

For value received, the undersigned Data Systems International (the "Borrower"), at 240 W. 200
S. #105, P.O. Box 750, Farmington, Utah 84025, promises to pay to the order of The Cantamar
LLC, (the "Lender"), at 1935 E. Deere Valley Dr., Layton, Utah 84040, (or at such other place as
the Lender may designate in writing) the sum of $269,285.07 with interest from January 11.
2002, on the unpaid principal at the rate of 8.00% per annum.
Unpaid principal after the Due Date shown below shall accrue interest at a rate of 30.00%
annually until paid.
The unpaid principal and accrued interest shall be payable in monthly installments of $1,795.23,
beginning on February 11, 2002, and continuing until May 11, 2002, (the "Due Date"), at which
time the remaining unpaid principal and interest shall be due in full.
THE BORROWER UNDERSTANDS THAT THE PAYMENT OF THE ABOVE
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS MAY NOT FULLY AMORTIZE THE PRINCIPAL BALANCE
OF THE NOTE, AND THEREFORE, A BALLOON PAYMENT MAY BE DUE ON THE DUE
DATE.
All payments on this Note shall be applied first in payment of accrued interest and any remainder
in payment of principal.
The Borrower promises to pay a late charge of $250.00 for each installment that remains unpaid
more than 10 day(s) after its Due Date. This late charge shall be paid as liquidated damages in
lieu of actual damages, and not as a penalty.
If any installment is not paid when due. the remaining unpaid principal balance and accrued
interest shall become due immediately at the option of the Lender.
The Borrower reserves the right to prepay this Note (in whole or in part) prior to the Due Date
with no prepayment penalty.
If any payment obligation under this Note is not paid when due, the Borrower promises to pay all
costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, whether or not a lawsuit is commenced as
part of the collection process.
This Note is secured by a Accounts receivables in the form of future contracts from Ventura

County, of which a minimum of 50% of the profits will be paid toward retirement of this loan.
This loan will be paid from proceeds received from that contract and or other receivables of the
company. In the case of new operating captial investments this loan will be retired upon the
funding of the new loan., dated January 11, 2002. The Lender is not required to rely on the
above security instrument and the assets secured therein for the payment of this Note in the case
of default, but may proceed directly against the Borrower.
If any of the following events of default occur, this Note and any other obligations
Borrower to the Lender, shall become di ic immediately, without demand or notice:

J

1) the failure of the Borrower to pay the principal and any accrued interest in full on or
before the Due Date;

•i :he filing of bankruptcy proceedings involving the Borrower as a Debtor;
nc application for the appointment of a receiver iur mc :;-.,rr\, wer;
5 j the making of a general assignment for the benefit of the Borrower's creditors;
6) the insolvency of the Borrower;
7) a misrepresent.!!!"'1
extending credit.

]

'«

. 1 rmln -
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-rpose "' *f obtaining or

In addition, the Borrower shall be in default if there is a sale, transfer, assignment, or any other
disposition of any assets pledged as security for the payment of this Note, or if there is a default
in any security agreement which sea ires this Note,
If any one or more of the provisions of this Note are determined to be unenforceable, in whole or
in part, for any reason, the remaining provisions shall remain fully operative.
iVll payments of principal and interest on this Note shall be paid in the legal currency of the
United States. The Borrower waives presentment for payment, protest, and notice of protest and
nonpayment of this Note,
No renewal or extension of this Note, delay in enforcing any rig! it of the Lender under this Note,
or assignment by Lender of this Note shall affect the liability or the obligations of the Borrower.
All rights of the Lender under this Note are cumulative and may be exercised concurrently or
consecutively at the Lender's option.
This Note shall be construed in accordance witn :I:L i::v... v-i ;ne ^iaic ci _ ...::.

Borrower:
Data Systems International

Carl Champa;

GUARANTY

Carl Champainge and Lon Williams both together and individually unconditionally guarantees
all the obligations of the Borrower under this Note.

Date

,Q*~ /7

6/

f*>

Carl Champainge and Lon Williams both together and individually

Carl Champairige and£#n Williams

